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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROSECUTION OF LYNNE STEWART 
On April 9, 2002, a troop of armed FBI agents stormed the 
Brooklyn town house of sixty-two-year-old Lynne Stewart. l A school 
librarian turned criminal lawyer, Stewart thought they had come for 
her life partner, longtime political activist Ralph Poynter.2 Flashing an 
arrest warrant, the agent in charge informed her otherwise, "We're 
not here for him, we're here for yoU.,,3 As her neighbors looked on, 
Stewart was handcuffed and taken off to jai1.4 
Indicted under a federal law that prohibits providing "material 
support or resources" to organizations designated by the Secretary of 
State as engaging in terrorist activity,S Stewart suddenly found herself 
in the same position as many of those she represents. However, much 
more fanfare attended her arrest than that of most of her clients. 
Attorney General John Ashcroft himself flew to New York to 
announce Stewart's twenty-four page indictment on two counts of 
lying to the government and two counts of aiding a terrorist 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Associate Director, 
Criminal Justice Clinic and E. Barrett Prettyman Fellowship Program. I thank Teresa 
Collett for inviting me to the South Texas College of Law Symposium on the Ethics of 
Litigation and Supriya Molina for helpful research assistance. 
1. Geraldine Baum, Circling the Legal Wagons, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2002, at AI. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. 18 U.S.c. § 2339A(a) (2000). 
31 
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organization.6 Suddenly, Stewart found herself facing substantial fines 
and up to fifteen years in federal prison for each count.7 
Six years before, at the urging of former Attorney General 
Ramsey Clark, Stewart had agreed to represent a blind Egyptian 
cleric accused of plotting to blow up various New York City 
landmarks, including bridges, tunnels, and the United Nations.s Sheik 
Omar Abdel Rahman, an opponent of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, 
was said to be the spiritual leader of the worldwide jihad movemene 
The sheik fired his court-appointed lawyer a month before trial, and 
Clark wanted Stewart to take the case so that the "Arab world would 
[not] feel betrayed by their friends on the American left.,,10 Although 
Stewart was reluctant to take the case because it might hurt her law 
practice, she agreed to do so after she met the sheik and felt a bond 
. h h' 11 WIt 1m. 
Although she made her living mostly representing poor African-
American and Latino men accused of street crime/2 Stewart had some 
experience in high profile criminal trials. 13 In 1981 she represented 
David Gilbert, a former member of the Weather Underground 
accused of robbery and murder in connection with a Brinks holdup.14 
In 1988 she represented Larry Davis, an African-American accused of 
6. Baum, supra note 1. 
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (2000). 
8. George Packer, Left Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2002, (Magazine), at 42. 
9. [d. 
10. [d. at 42-44. 
11. See Adam Gopnik, et aI., The Talk of the Town, The Woman Behind the Sheikh, 
NEW YORKER, Jan. 23, 1995, at 28 (stating that Stweart and the sheik '''hit it off almost 
immediately"'). 
12. See Packer, supra note 8, at 45 ("Most of her cases and clients are too obscure to 
count as politicaL"). On the other hand, Stewart regards these more mundane criminal 
cases as political, too. [d. When reading Richard Wright's Native Son recently, she 
exclaimed: "This is why I'm a criminal defense lawyer! It's because he's talking about these 
kids in the black community that have no voice, that can't articulate, that are just so 
consumed by their own anger and frustration. And it hasn't changed." [d. She says she was 
also drawn to criminal defense "'because [she] could indulge [her] anti-authoritarian 
instincts.'" Gopnik, supra note 11, at 28. 
13. See generally Peter Margulies, The Virtues and Vices of Solidarity: Regulating the 
Roles of Lawyers for Clients Accused of Terrorist Activity, 62 MD. L. REV. 173,217 (2003) 
(discussing the role of lawyers in representing alleged terrorists and other political 
defendants ). 
14. See Gopnik, supra note 11, at 28; Greg B. Smith, Lawyer and Aids for Cleric Are 
Charged, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 10,2002, at 2. 
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trying to kill six New York City police officers.15 She worked with 
well-known radical lawyer William Kunstler on several cases.16 Before 
her law practice became strictly criminal defense, Stewart had a 
general law practice in which she represented the poor, battered 
women seeking orders of protection, and gays accused of violating 
sodomy laws.17 Before her arrest, the only time Stewart had gotten in 
trouble as a lawyer was when she refused to testify before a grand jury 
about the origin of an alleged drug-dealing client's money in 1991.18 
She maintained that this information was protected by the attorney-
client privilege/9 and resisted the prosecutor for years before finally 
pleading guilty to contempt of court.20 
The sheik's trial lasted for moilths.21 Stewart fought hard for her 
client, arguing that the sheik was a champion of the oppressed people 
of his native land who was framed by the government because of 
political and religious beliefs.22 By all accounts, she genuinely believed 
her client was wrongly accused23 and wept when the jury returned a 
guilty verdict. After the sheik's conviction she continued to represent 
him on appeal, visiting him at the federal prisons where he was held.24 
Lynne Stewart's conduct with regard to the special prison 
regulations under which her client was held formed the basis for her 
15. See Gopnik, supra note 11. Although Stewart tried this case with William 
Kunstler, most credit Davis's acquittal of the most serious charges on self-defense grounds 
to Stewart. See Leonard Levitt & Ellis Henican, Davis Gets 5-l5-Year Sentence: Cops Irked 
by "Slap on the Wrist," NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1988, at 4. 
16. See Pete Hamill, The Defense Won't Rest Easy, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 20, 2002, 
available at 2002 WL 19320918; see generally WILLIAM M. KUNSTLER, My LIFE AS A 
RADICAL LAWYER (1994) (discussing his legal career). 
17. See Leonard Post, Indicted and Defiant, NEWSDAY, June 3, 2002, at B6. 
18. See Smith, supra note 14. 
19. See id. 
20. See id. Because the charge was a misdemeanor, Stewart was allowed to continue 
practicing law. Id. 
21. See generally Joseph P. Fried, In Muslim Cleric's Trial, a Radical Defender, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 28, 1995, at B1 (stating that the presentation of the prosecution's case against 
the sheik lasted for five and a half months). 
22. See id. (describing the sheik as a '''spiritual and inspirational guide' who was 
being prosecuted for his speech"); see also Packer, supra note 8, at 44. 
23. See CBS News: 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, May 5, 2002) [hereinafter 
60 Minutes] (Lynne Stewart saying to Mike Wallace, "I believed, and I believe today, that 
he is wrongfully convicted"); see also Fried, supra note 21. 
24. 60 Minutes, supra note 23. 
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indictment.25 Under these regulations, Rahman was prohibited from 
communicating with anyone outside the prison, and Stewart had to 
agree in writing not to convey any messages of a political nature from 
him to the outside world or otherwise communicate messages on his 
behalf.26 Stewart admits that two years prior to her indictment, she 
held a press conference and read Rahman's political "advice" to 
followers in Egypt.27 When she did this, the Clinton administration 
had her sign another statement that she would abide by the prison 
rules prohibiting her from broadcasting messages for the sheik.28 No 
one tried to stop her from seeing her client, nor was Stewart 
threatened with either disciplinary or criminal charges.29 
The government also alleges that during prison visits Stewart 
enabled the sheik to get his message out to followers through a court-
approved Arabic translator, who has also been indicted.30 The 
government's evidence consists of tape recordings of those 
Id. 
25. See id. 
26. See id. 
27. See id. 
WALLACE: The sheik wanted her to issue a press release telling his followers in 
Egypt that they had his permission to end their cease-fire with the Egyptian 
government, had his permission to resume their attacks. 
But Stewart told us the message was merely political advice, not a military order. 
STEWART: To me, it was not saying, "Take out the guns and mow them down." 
It was more like an advisory-this is what I'm thinking about. Politically, more 
than it was a call to arms. He hasn't been in Egypt since '89. He's hardly got his 
finger on the pulse of military operations. 
I knew that there was a possibility that the government would cut me off from 
him for releasing this statement. But he had told me he wanted this statement to 
get out to his people. 
WALLACE: So, in effect, you made a mistake. 
STEW ART: It's a mistake, but is it an indictable offense? Is this materially 
aiding a terrorist organization? 
WALLACE: Ashcroft obviously thinks that it is. 
STEWART: Well, we'll see what a jury thinks. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. Although the translator's case has generated far less publicity, he also denies 
any wrongdoing in this case. See Mark Hamblett, New York Defender Charged with 
Supporting Terrorism, RECORDER (New York), Apr. 10, 2002, at 3 (noting Mohammed 
Yousry's not gUilty plea). 
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conversations.31 Stewart has denied this charge, and as the contents of 
the tape recordings have not yet been made public, it is impossible to 
assess the weight or credibility of the evidence.32 
Stewart's indictment was disturbing to defense lawyers and civil 
libertarians. Stanford Law Professor Deborah Rhode voiced the 
concerns of many in an op-ed in the New York Times: 
America's civil liberties depend on counsel willing to assert 
them. John Adams, who reported losing half his practice after 
defending British officers charged in the Boston Massacre, 
considered that case "one of the best pieces of service that I 
ever rendered for my country." If the indictment against Ms. 
Stewart signals a broader trend to crack down not just on 
terrorists but on those courageous enough to represent them, we 
are all at risk.33 
Those who knew Stewart were stunned.34 Stewart did not have a 
reputation as either a kook or a loose cannon.35 Notwithstanding her 
leftist politics, Stewart was known as a "nuts-and-bolts attorney who 
was always courteous in court.,,36 Many thought highly of her legal 
skills.37 As one lawyer who tried cases with her put it: '''[S]he was a 
brilliant courtroom advocate .... She's the bravest and strongest 
advocate for the downtrodden.",3H 
The reporters who covered Stewart's indictment also seemed 
surprised. Noting that she is a grandmother,39 and describing her as 
31. 
32. 
33. 
A27. 
60 Minutes, supra note 23. 
See id. 
Deborah L. Rhode, Terrorists and Their Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,2002, at 
34. See Michael Powell, An Advocate for Radicals Whom Most Lawyers Spurn, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 10,2002, at A9. 
35. [d. 
36. [d. 
37. See Steven Lubet, There's a Difference Between Defense, Assist, CHI. SUN-TIMES, 
May 1,2002, at 45 ("By all accounts, Lynne Stewart is a tough, smart, determined lawyer, 
dedicated to providing first-rate defense for unpopular clients."); see also Stephen J. 
Singer, Defense Attorneys Walk a Thin Line, NEWSDA Y, Apr. 18, 2002, at A43 ("Lynne 
Stewart is exactly the kind of gutsy lawyer who would step up to the plate and accept the 
assignment to take on this kind of client. Like it or not, the judicial system needs such 
people if we are to continue to be a nation of law."). 
38. Powell, supra note 34 (quoting Ronald L. Kuoy). 
39. See id. (describing Stewart as "[s]hort and roundish, a grandmother who often has 
a New York Mets cap perched atop her head"); Baum, supra note 1 (referring to Stewart 
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"matronly looking,,,40 "plump,,,41 and somewhat unkempt,42 they noted 
that "Lynne Stewart does not fit the stereotype of a radical 
attorney.,,43 
As a defense lawyer who shares Stewart's commitment to zealous 
advocacy on behalf of the downtrodden,44 I was struck by her 
prosecution. What caused Lynne Stewart, after more than two 
decades of defense lawyering in the best tradition of the legal 
profession to cross the linet5 Holding aside the political climate of the 
as "plump" and "grandmotherly"); Post, supra note 17 (noting that "[p]ictures of 
[Stewart's] seven multiethnic grandchildren adorn her office .... "). 
40. Sheryl McCarthy, Her Case for Larry Davis Her Client's Victory, Says Defense 
Attorney Lynne Stewart, Was for "The Voiceless People Who Never Get a Decent Shake," 
NEWS DAY, Dec. 15. 1988, at 3; see also Hamill, supra note 16 (referring to Stewart as the 
"gray-haired, chubby scourge of the Republic"). 
41. Baum, supra note 1. 
42. See Post, supra note 17 ("Her now-gray hair lays flat on her head and falls to her 
ears. Her bangs are stringy. She is soft in body and has soft eyes. Her expansion watchband 
is askew, the watch a $10 knockoff bought on Canal Street."). 
43. Powell, supra note 34 (radical lawyer Ronald Kuby noting that Stewart's 
courtroom demeanor was more like '''your kindergarten teacher'" than fiery radical); see 
also Post, supra note 17 ("[F]rom all appearances, Stewart, who now lives in Brooklyn, is 
anything but a rebel."). Indeed, some of the physical descriptions of Lynne Stewart are so 
unsparing, so unkind, I began to think I would rather be indicted than described in this 
fashion. See, e.g., Packer, supra note 8, at 44. 
Physically, Lynne Stewart suggests a cheerful and profound self-neglect. In press 
photographs she resembles Ma Kettle. Her hair, gray and lank, seems to have 
expired on her head. She dresses for court like a Sicilian widow in sensible shoes, 
hobbling side to side from excess weight and a recent courtroom fall. Friends 
have to remind her to cut her hair, which she did after pleading "emphatically 
not guilty" while the camera fixed her in their unpitying sights. 
Id. Some journalists were a little kinder. One described her as a having a "cherubic face, a 
raspy voice, and an engaging smile." Gopnik, supra note 11, at 28. 
44. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, Defending Defending: The Case for Unmitigated Zeal on 
Behalf of People Who Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 933-34 (2000); Abbe 
Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 511, 520 (2000); Abbe Smith, 
Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
1585,1589-90 (1999); Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal Defense, 
50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 446 (1999); Abbe Smith, For Tom load and Tom Robinson: The 
Moral Obligation to Defend the Poor, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 869, 881, 889-90; Abbe 
Smith, Carrying On in Criminal Court: When Criminal Defense Is Not So Sexy and Other 
Grievances, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 723, 725, 729-30 (1995); Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes 
to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensitive New Age Public Defender, 28 
HARV. c.R.-c.L. L. REV. 1,61-62 (1993). 
45. I am not addressing the allegation that Stewart willfully allowed illicit 
communications to pass from the sheik to the translator to his followers in this paper. In 
addition to denying these charges, Stewart is, of course, presumed innocent. I am 
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times,46 did Stewart's approach to lawyering-whether in political or 
not terribly political cases-lead to her demise? Is her approach to 
lawyering different from most of the bar? 
In this paper I will discuss the conduct that led to Stewart's 
prosecution and her approach to lawyering generally. I will examine 
whether her view of zeal47 and devotion48 is at odds with the prevailing 
ethics and ethos of defense lawyering, and, if not, what went wrong. I 
will also explore the question of boundaries in lawyering generally. 
concerned only with her acknowledged violation of the prison rule prohibiting her from 
giving a press statement on behalf of the sheik. 
46. This is not easy to do under the circumstances of this case. See, e.g., David Cole, 
Fight Terrorism Fairly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19,2002, at A17. 
[d. 
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, passed in 1996, makes it a 
crime to provide "material support" to any group designated as "terrorist"-
without regard to whether the support was actuaJly intended to further terrorist 
activity. 
This law, rarely invoked before Sept. 11, is now the cornerstone of the 
Justice Department's domestic war on terrorism. 
47. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' 
ETHICS, 79-80 (2d ed. 2002); Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 
4 (1951-1952) (quoting Brougham with approval); see also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, THE 
BEST DEFENSE, at xv-xvi (Random House 1982) (noting that zealous advocacy is "neither 
a radical nor a transient notion"). 
Zeal has long been and remains an ethical mandate for lawyers. See ABA 
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1996) ("The duty of a lawyer, both 
to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within the bounds of 
law."). But see ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.3 cmt. 1 
(1996) ("A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client 
and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf. However, a lawyer is not bound to press 
for every advantage that might be realized by a client. A lawyer has professional discretion 
in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued."). 
Some legal scholars are critical of what they regard as overly zealous advocacy 
and urge a return to "civility, trust, and fair dealing." See generally WILLIAM H. SIMON, 
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 4-25 (1998); see also Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the 
Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and the 0.1. Simpson Defense Team, 29 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 291, 321 (1998) (criticizing the defense tactics in the 0.1. Simpson 
case); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Postmodern, 
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 5 (1996) (criticizing the adversary system 
from the perspective of multiculturalism). 
48. See ABA MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 15 (1996). 
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II. THE ETHICS OF ADVOCACY 
When I was invited to speak at this symposium, I was told it 
would address the ethics of advocacy, which I regard as somewhat 
broader than the ethics of litigation. I thought perhaps the symposium 
was held to belatedly mark the fiftieth anniversary of Charles Curtis's 
classic article of the same name.49 I was pleased with this thought as I 
have long been an admirer of Curtis's candid depiction of the lawyer's 
role in an adversary system.50 As Curtis has his detractors,S) I imagined 
there might be some disagreement about his view of the proper 
bounds of zeal and looked forward to some heated exchanges. 
Unfortunately, I was wrong about both the title of the symposium-
which was changed somewhere along the way-and about Charles 
Curtis having anything to do with it. 
Nonetheless, Curtis seems a good place to start-though I am 
going to digress for a moment and follow Professor Rhode into a 
discussion of John Adams, because so few people know about 
Adams's dual role as patriot and rebel defender. 
The future second President of the United States was thirty-four 
years old when what would later be called the Boston Massacre 
occurred. It was a cold night in Boston on March 5, 1770. On a snowy 
square, a group of men and boys were taunting the lone British sentry 
who was posted in front of the Custom House.52 Somewhere, a church 
bell began to ring, and crowds began pouring into the streets, 
brandishing sticks and c1ubs.53 As several hundred angry colonialists 
converged at the Custom House, the guard was joined by eight British 
soldiers with loaded muskets.54 Shouting and cursing, the crowd began 
to bombard the Redcoats with snow balls, pieces of ice, shells, and 
stones.55 Five men were killed when soldiers suddenly opened fire.56 
49. See Curtis, supra note 47. 
50. For a similar approach, and one which has sparked similar controversy, see 
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975); see also 
FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 47. 
51. See Barbara Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 175 (1983) 
(noting that Curtis's article has generated "outrage and disparagement"). 
52. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 65 (2001). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
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There was an enormous outcry against the killings, and the 
soldiers and their captain were arrested and charged with murder.57 
When no one else would take the case, John Adams readily agreed to 
represent the accused.58 Adams believed that "no man in a free 
country should be denied the right to counsel and a fair trial" and that 
"the case was of the utmost importance.,,59 Adams stated, "'If by 
supporting the rights of mankind, and of invincible truth, I shall 
contribute to save from the agonies of death one unfortunate victim of 
tyranny, or of ignorance, equally fatal, his blessings and years of 
transport will be sufficient consolation to me for the contempt of all 
mankind.,,,60 
Adams understood the costs of representing the British soldiers, 
but felt that "[a]s a lawyer, his duty was clear.,,61 He knew "[t]hat he 
would be hazarding his hard-earned reputation and, in his words, 
'incurring a clamor and popular suspicions and prejudices' against 
him. ,,62 Although Adams had been involved in other high profile 
cases,63 he had never before placed himself on the side of the despised. 
His defense of the Redcoats was seen as almost traitorous.64 
In separate trials, Adams succeeded in obtaining acquittals for 
the captain and six of the eight soldiers.65 In doing so, he not only put 
the victims on trial by calling them an unruly mob,66 he also put the 
57. See id. at 65-66 (calling the killings a '''bloody butchery,'" Samuel Adams and 
many others saw the incident as one more example of British tyranny). 
58. Id. at 66. 
59. !d. 
60. Id. at 66-67 (quoting Cesare, Marchese di Beccaria). 
61. Id. at 66. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. ("Only the year before, in 1769, Adams had defended four American sailors 
charged with killing a British naval officer who had boarded their ship with a press gang to 
grab them for the British navy."). Adams obtained an acquittal on the grounds of self-
defense. Id. The difference between that case and that of the British soldiers was that the 
public was on his side in the former, as most people were strongly opposed to the practice 
of impressment. Id. 
64. See id. Adams was rumored to have been bribed to take the case. Id. In fact, he 
was paid a tiny retainer and nothing more. Id. 
65. Id. at 66, 68. Two soldiers were convicted of manslaughter and were branded on 
their thumbs. Id. at 68. 
66. Id. at 67. Adams was not above using racism and prejudice to make his case. He 
referred to the victims as a "motley rabble of saucy boys, Negroes and mulattoes, Irish 
teagues and outlandish jacktars. And why should we scruple to call such a people a mob, I 
can't conceive, unless the name is too respectable for them." Id. For the ethics of 
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government on trial as well.67 He spoke out against the practice of 
quartering soldiers in town, which gave rise to the mob in the first 
place.68 
Adams paid a price for his zealous defense of the Redcoats. He 
was pilloried in the press and his practice suffered.69 Still, over time, 
even his critics came to admire his "fierce integrity" and his role in the 
case probably did "increase his public standing, making him in the 
long run more respected than ever.,,70 Later in life, Adams described 
the case as "the most exhausting case he ever undertook," but he also 
considered it "'one of the most gallant, generous, manly, and 
disinterested actions of [his] whole life. ",71 
I share this story about John Adams not only because of the 
obvious parallels to the circumstances of Lynne Stewart's defense of 
the Sheik, but also because Adams seems to be a proponent of the 
same sort of lawyering that Charles Curtis espouses. 
Curtis, a Boston Brahmin like Adams,n believed in advocacy. 
Like Adams, and more importantly Lord Brougham before him, 
Curtis believed: 
"[A]n advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, 
knows in the discharges of that office but one person in the 
world-that client and no other .... Nay, separating even the 
duties of a patriot from those of an advocate, and casting them if 
need be to the wind, he must go on reckless of the 
consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be to involve his 
country in confusion for his client's protection.,,73 
exploiting prejudice in criminal defense see generally Eva S. Nilsen, The Criminal Defense 
Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1994); see also Abbe 
Smith, Defending Defending: The Case For Unmitigated Zeal On Behalf Of People Who 
Do Terrible Things, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 925, 948-57 (2000); Abbe Smith, Burdening the 
Least of Us: "Race Conscious" Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1584 (1999). 
67. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 52, at 67. 
68. See id. 
69. [d. at 68. 
70. [d. 
71. [d. 
72. Interestingly, neither of them have much in common with Stewart, who was 
raised in modest circumstances in Queens, New York, and attended Queens College and 
Rutgers University Law School. See Packer, supra note 8, at 44; Gopnik, supra note 11, at 
28. Both Adams and Curtis attended Harvard. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 52, at 35; 
Babcock, supra note 51, at 176. 
73. Curtis, supra note 47, at 4 (quoting Lord Brougham in the divorce proceedings of 
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Curtis describes Brougham's famous argument before the House 
of Lords as "the classic statement of the loyalty which a lawyer owes 
to is client .... ,,74 Brougham's statement was not simply a defense of 
advocacy, it was part of his defense strategy. It was meant to be a 
"menace.,,75 He said what he said to warn King George that if he 
pressed the divorce against Queen Caroline he should be prepared to 
forfeit the crown if need be, for Brougham would not pull his 
punches.76 It mattered not that the country might be in chaos; he 
would serve his client. 
Curtis does not mince words when he describes what it means to 
be an advocate. Not only does an advocate owe a higher duty of care 
to the client than to anyone else-indeed, "[t]he more good faith and 
devotion the lawyer owes to his client, the less he owes to others when 
he is acting for his client,,77-but an advocate must treat outsiders as 
"barbarians and enemies.,,78 Curtis does not apologize for his 
approach to advocacy; to the contrary, he finds virtue in it. He says it 
"goes back a long way" to the time of the Greeks.79 
Curtis understands, as Adams recognized, that this kind of 
advocacy does not lead to great popularity: "You devote yourself to 
the interests of another at the peril of yourself .... Men will do for 
others what they are not willing to do for themselves-nobler as well 
as ignoble things."so 
Curtis describes some of the ignoble things that an advocate must 
do, no matter how improper or immoral these things seem to others.8! 
He says that "knavery,,82 and "insincerity,,83 are simply part of 
Queen Carolyn and George IV). 
74. /d. 
75. Id. (quoting Brougham reflecting upon his earlier speech). 
76. See id. 
77. [d. at 5-6. 
78. [d. at 5. 
79. See id. (" It is the pre-platonic ethics which Socrates had disposed of at the very 
outset of the Republic; that is that justice consists of doing good to your friends and harm 
to your enemies."). 
80. [d. at 6. 
81. See id. at 3-23. 
82. [d. at 20 ("There's no reason why a lawyer ... should not recognize the knavery 
that is part of his vocation." (quoting Montaigne)). 
83. [d. at 9. 
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lawyering, and we should be honest about this.84 Curtis puts it plainly: 
lawyers are "required to be disingenuous.,,85 Curtis explains that, in 
court, lawyers must regularly make statements and take positions they 
do not believe in.x6 However, lawyers may also be deceitful out of 
court. For example, when a police officer shows up at a lawyer's office 
demanding to know where the lawyer's client is, "[o]f course he lies."x7 
Curtis is impatient with a less forthright depiction of lawyers' work: "I 
don't see why we should not come out roundly and say that one of the 
functions of a lawyer is to lie for his client.,,88 
The reason that lawyers may and, indeed, must engage in this 
conduct89 is because of the lawyer's "sacred duty" to the client.90 This 
duty is one of singular devotion; the lawyer is devoted to the client 
and the client only.91 Though the relationship is a professional one, it 
is nonetheless "intimate.,,92 Curtis likens the relationship between 
lawyer and client to that between spouses, between parent and child, 
and between dear friends.93 
All of which brings us back to Lynne Stewart. She was clearly a 
devoted, zealous advocate.94 She approached the defense of her 
84. See id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 8. 
88. Id. at 9. 
89. See id. at 8-9; see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE O.J. 
SIMPSON CASE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 145 (1996) ("What a defense 
attorney 'may' do, he must do, if it is necessary to defend his client. A zealous defense 
attorney has a professional obligation to take every legal and ethically permissible step 
that will serve the client's best interest-even if the attorney finds the step personally 
distasteful."); cf Post, supra note 17 ("'When you take a case, you have to be able to give it 
100 percent.'" (quoting Stewart». 
90. Curtis, supra note 47, at 4. 
91. See id. at 3 ("[The lawyer's] loyalty runs to his client. He has no other master."). 
92. Id. at 8 ("The relation between a lawyer and his client is one of the intimate 
relations."). 
93. See id. at 8-9 (noting that just as "[y]ou would lie for your wife ... [or] your 
child .... [or] others with whom you are intimate enough, close enough to lie for," you 
would lie for a client). 
94. In Curtis's essay, he cites ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 15. See id. at 4-5 (referring to the "entire devotion to the interest 
of the client, [and] warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights"). In fact, the 
language Curtis points to is taken from George Sharswood's influential essay on lawyer's 
ethics-something Curtis apparently did not know. Id. at 5 n.5 (the editors of Curtis's 
article pointed to GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 78-79 
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controversial client with a single-mindedness that would have made 
Lord Brougham, John Adams, George Sharswood,95 and Charles 
Curtis proud.96 But somewhere along the way, she apparently crossed 
a line.97 I would like to determine how that happened. 
III. ON THE IMPORTANCE OF BOUNDARIES 
Though Curtis believes in lawyers representing clients with 
"entire devotion," he also understands that "[t]he fact is, the 'entire 
devotion' is not entire.,,98 Curtis explains: 
The full discharge of a lawyer's duty to his client requires him to 
withhold something. If a lawyer is entirely devoted to his client, 
his client receives something less than he has a right to expect. 
For, if a man devotes the whole of himself to another, he 
mutilates or diminishes himself, and the other receives the 
devotion of so much the less. This is no paradox, but a simple 
calculus of the spirit.99 
What Curtis means is that if a lawyer is too devoted, if the lawyer 
gives too much of him or herself, if the lawyer fails to maintain a 
certain amount of distance, he or she will lose perspective. loo A lawyer 
(5th ed. 1884)). 
95. See SHARSWOOD, supra note 94, at 3-6. Sharswood was a judge on the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court who played a significant role in the development of codified 
legal ethics in this country. See Judith L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers' Pro 
Bono Responsibilities: From Noblesse Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TuL. L. REV. 91, 
95-105 (2002). 
96. See Anthony M. DeStefano, Attorney's Indictment Troubles Colleagues, 
NEWSDA Y, Apr. 10,2002, at A43 (noting the "zeal and competence [Stewart] has shown in 
defense of unpopular clients"). 
97. I do not wish to convict Ms. Stewart before she is tried. She may well be found 
innocent of the charges against her. I am commenting only on the conduct to which she 
admits-holding a press conference and conveying a message to the sheik's followers. 
98. Curtis, supra note 47, at 18. 
99. /d. 
100. See id. at 21 (noting the need for detachment and stating "[a] man who has 
devoted his life to taking on other people's troubles, would be swamped by them if he were 
to adopt them as his own"); see also Charles Ogletree, Beyond Justifications: Seeking 
Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (1993) (arguing 
that empathy is a sustaining motivations for public defenders); Abbe Smith, Too Much 
Heart and Not Enough Heat: The Short Life and Fractured Ego of the Empathic, Heroic 
Public Defender (unpublished manuscript, on file with the South Texas Law Review) 
(arguing that too much empathy leads to burnout and bad judgment). 
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can get too close. And when that happens the lawyer is unable to give 
the client the very thing the client needs most: the lawyer's sound, 
dispassionate judgment. 101 
Lynne Stewart has a reputation for being a dedicated lawyer, 
someone who is committed to and connected to her clients.I02 She 
exemplifies the idea of a "client-centered"I03 lawyer-the lawyer who 
is devoted to the client's liberty, autonomy, and "self-actualization."I04 
Stewart's devotion-her client centeredness-may have been 
especially ardent in the case of the sheik, because she was so taken 
with him. For the sheik, physical freedom took a back seat to political 
self-determination and self-actualization. What the sheik wanted, 
what he needed more than anything else, was to maintain his political 
101. See Curtis, supra note 47, at 18 (offering Louis Brandeis as an example of 
someone who was both a passionate advocate and a judicious one). 
102. See Hamill, supra note 16. 
"I probably see my job as something more than most defense attorneys see 
it .... You know, if a client has to have a visit, and it's Mother's Day, and the 
kids are coming, and your grandmother's coming from Boston, and-whatever 
else-you go in and see the client. Or if a mother is trying to get her son out of 
jail, you put off everything, as I just did an hour ago, and see her and try to help 
her understand why he's not getting out of jail today, and what's happening .... " 
Id. (quoting Stewart). 
103. FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 47, at 127 (noting that "the ethic of trust and 
confidence is client-centered"); Monroe H. Freedman, Ethical Ends and Ethical Means, 12 
J. LEGAL EDUC. 55, 56 (1991) ("My view of lawyers' ethics is ... client-centered, 
emphasizing the lawyer's role in enhancing the client's autonomy as a free person in a free 
society."). Monroe Freedman may have been the first scholar to articulate the theory of 
client-centeredness. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client 
Interests, 6 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1319 (1995) ("Monroe Freedman led the 
intellectual development of this theory, characterizing client orientation as a constitutional 
guarantee and as an essential element in upholding the dignity of individuals."). For 
materials on client-centered counseling see generally DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. 
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED ApPROACH 
(1977); DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? (1974); 
Robert M. Bastress, Client Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for Lawyers, 10 
J. LEGAL PROF. 97 (1985). For thoughtful criticism of client-centered counseling, see 
generally Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REV. 697 (1992); 
Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 501 (1990); Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717 (1987). 
104. Some have suggested that theories on client-centered counseling come from the 
work of psychologist Carl Rogers. See, e.g., Bastress, supra note 103, at 100 n.7. For a 
critical view of Rogers's focus on self-actualization and its impact on "moral 
responsibility," see William H. Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal 
Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487, 493-94 (1980). 
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voice, his clout. He wanted to pursue his ideological cause no matter 
what happened to his physical being.105 The time and energy Stewart 
spent on the sheik's appeal was probably of little importance to him, 
as he no doubt knew he would not prevail on appeal. His need of a 
lawyer, of Stewart, may have had more to do with friendship-having 
someone to talk to, having a confidante and a sympathetic ear-than 
with the provision of legal services.106 
Still, how did Stewart go from being an exemplary client-centered 
lawyer, doing what she could do to legitimately advance her client's 
case and cause, to allegedly aiding him directly in his criminal 
activities?l07 Although the line may be easy to discern after the fact, it 
may not have looked so clear to Stewart at the time.lOH Defense 
lawyers often become intensely identified with clients, perhaps 
especially so when the client is a social or political pariah. When 
everyone else is against the client the lawyer "pumps up the volume" 
a bit. Add to this the criminal defender's tendency to flaunt 
authority,l09 and you get defenders who are willing to break a rule 
here or there, especially when it comes to autocratic places like jails 
and prisons. llD Stewart may not have meant to further violence when 
she communicated her client's message; she may have seen herself as 
resisting overly harsh prison rules and asserting what she deemed to 
be her client's fundamental right of self-expression. III 
105. Id. 
106. See Phyllis Goldfarb, A Clinic Runs Through It, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 65, 86 (1994) 
(discussing the representation of a client on death row for whom friendship was more 
important than legal advocacy); see also Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral 
Foundations of the Lawyer·Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1088-89 (1976). 
107. Again, I am only talking about the remarks Stewart made to the press on her 
client's behalf, which she does not deny. 
108. See Singer, supra note 37 ("[W]hile you can be vociferous in the defense of justice 
to provide your client with a fair trial, you must avoid taking on the client's cause. 
Granted, this separation is hard for some of us to maintain. "). 
109. See Mary Halloran, Ode to a Criminal Defense Lawyer, CAL. LAW., June 1998, at 
96 (describing the public defender "personality"). Anti-authoritarianism seems to be part 
of that personality; see Gopnik, supra note 11, at 28 (noting Stewart's anti-authoritarian 
instincts ). 
110. See DeStefano, supra note 96 ("'We have all done things in violation of prison 
regulations, like bringing cigarettes to guys,' said one prominent Manhattan attorney."). 
111. See id. ("'I don't believe she thought she was signing off on death warrants and 
passing out Holocaust decrees,' said the [prominent] attorney, who did not wish to be 
named. Rather, Stewart may have believed she was tweaking onerous prison rules."). 
HeinOnline -- 44 S. Tex. L. Rev. 46 2002-2003
46 SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:31 
You have to get close to clients-no matter who the client is or 
what he or she is alleged to have done-in order to work with that 
client and fashion a defense. I12 The longer a case goes on and the 
higher the stakes, the closer the lawyer sometimes gets. This is 
especially so if the lawyer likes the client, if he or she has any real 
feeling for the client. l13 Stewart clearly got close to the sheik. She liked 
him. She may have gotten too close. 
Stewart is not the first lawyer to have done so. Every defense 
lawyer in every jurisdiction has heard about someone who got in over 
his or her head, who became overly attached to a client and 
overstepped proper bounds. Janet Malcolm told one such story in her 
1999 book, The Crime of Sheila McGough.1l4 In the book, Malcolm 
examines the fraudulent prosecution of solo criminal practitioner 
Sheila McGough, who, like Stewart, became a lawyer later in life. lls 
Though McGough was far from a radical/ 16 her story is an odd 
112. See Singer, supra note 37 ("One of the conflicts inherent in [representing the 
despised] includes the need to establish some degree of rapport with even the most 
despicable clients if you are ever to provide them with a viable defense."). 
113. As defenders we may not love all our clients. However, we cannot help loving 
some. I have written about the exceptionally close, loving relationship I have with a client 
Patsy Kelly Jarrett. See Smith, Defending the Innocent, supra note 44, at 485-522. Although 
my relationship with this client is unique in some regards, the feelings I have for her are 
not. For example, I currently represent a seventeen-year-old boy accused of committing 
serious, violent crimes, including rape. Like many in his circumstances, his crimes are 
largely the result of his own troubled childhood. He is only beginning to make this 
connection for himself. In the course of representing this client-in the course of spending 
time with him, getting to know him, and coming to care for him-his crimes have faded 
from view. This is something that often happens to defenders: we see the client, not the 
crime. My client is a lonely, frightened, vulnerable youth who lights up when he sees me. I 
have to stop myself sometimes from expressing the love I know he feels for me, and which 
I cannot help but reciprocate. Feelings that come up in any relationship, even a 
professional one, can be powerful. It seems to me it is important to acknowledge the 
feelings in order to deal with them appropriately. The client is allowed to get carried away, 
but lawyers (and other professionals) must keep our wits about us. See generally IRVIN D. 
Y ALOM, MOMMA AND THE MEANING OF LIFE: TALES OF PSYCHOTHERAPY (1999) 
(offering stories from Yalom's practice as a psychoanalyst). 
114. See generally JANET MALCOLM, THE CRIME OF SHEILA MCGOUGH (1999) 
(discussing the story of a solo criminal practitioner that became too attached to her client). 
115. See id. at 34-35 (noting that McGough had been an editor and administrator at 
the Carnegie Institute when, at age thirty-nine, she left her job to attend law school). It is 
interesting that both Stewart and McGough had previous non-law related careers, went to 
law school in their thirties, and soon after graduating, went into practice for themselves 
taking mostly court-appointed cases. See id. 
116. See MALCOLM, supra note 114, at 35 ("Sheila wasn't, and isn't, a lefty. Since high 
school, she had worked for the local Republican organization, and she was well versed in 
the Right's unsentimental rhetoric: she was 'for law and order' and 'against the coddling of 
criminals."'). Physically, she does not bear any resemblance to Lynne Stewart. See id. at 11. 
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precursor to Stewart's. At trial and throughout the book, McGough 
claims to have been both an unwitting pawn of a charming client who 
was also an experienced con artist, and a victim of vindictive 
prosecutors.117 Although she was a relatively inexperienced criminal 
defense lawyer, lack of experience alone could not account for 
McGough's failure to adequately distance herself from her client's 
unlawful activities. An otherwise careful personllR and lawyer-in 
some ways careful to a fault-McGough failed to see that she was 
giving herself over to her client in the name of zealous and devoted 
advocacy.JJ9 Indeed, she allowed herself to be manipulated and used. 120 
I have often thought that excessive devotion is a greater peril 
than excessive zeal on behalf of a client. When lawyers get too close 
to clients-when they become their client's "best friend,,,121 their 
client's "family,,,122 or worse, succumb to the "eros [that] finds its way 
into most lawyer-client relationships,,123-things can go off-course. 
There need not be a clear breach of professional norms, like sleeping 
with a client, for lawyers to get too close.124 
Id. 
[She ] looked and sounded like one of the blandly wholesome heroines of fifties 
movies. She was small and blond and pretty, and her voice was fresh and girlish, 
formed for phrases like "Gee whillikers!" and inflected by habits of unremitting 
good sportsmanship. She looked younger than her fifty-four years .... With her 
pale, translucent skin and single-strand pearl necklace and decorous navy-blue 
suit, she might have been the director of a small foundation or a corporate wife 
from Scarsdale, in town for a matinee. 
117. See id. at 6. 
118. See id. ("She is a woman of almost preternatural honesty and decency."). 
119. See id. at 7-8. 
120. See id.; cf Brigid Schulte & Raja Mishra, From Prison Break to Heartache, 
WASH. POST, June 13, 1999, at 1 (recounting the saga of a prison psychologist who became 
romantically involved with a prisoner and helped him to escape). For a cutting critique of 
Malcolm's book, see Richard A. Posner, In the Fraud Archives, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 
19,1999, at 29 (decreeing the book as inaccurate, irresponsible, and overwrought). 
121. Compare Ogletree, supra note 100, at 1242-43 (arguing that empathy for and 
friendship with clients motivate criminal defenders) with Smith, supra note 102 (arguing 
that too much empathy and friendship is a bad thing for defenders); see also TOM WOLFE, 
THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 382 (Bantam Book ed. 1988) ("What did I tell you the 
first time you walked into this office? I told you two things. I told you, 'Irene, I'm not 
gonna be your friend. I'm gonna be your lawyer. But I'm gonna do more for you than your 
friends. '''). 
122. See Fredric Dannen, Defending the Mafia, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 21, 1994, at 
64 (examining the professional life of Gerald Shargel, a prominent criminal defense lawyer 
who represents alleged members of organized crime). 
123. MALCOLM, supra note 114, at 27. 
124. See id. at 26-28 (discussing McGough's relationship with client Bob Bailes). 
Although, on the one hand, there was no actual romance between McGough and her 
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Excessive devotion to, interest in, and identification with clients 
can happen to lawyers who have perfectly good boundaries the rest of 
the time. There is this one client, this one case that gets under the 
lawyer's skin.125 Maybe the lawyer perceives the client to be a victim of 
a horrible injustice. Maybe the lawyer feels a real affinity for the 
client, something approaching love.126 Maybe the client or case is 
filling some sort of need in the lawyer that the lawyer isn't even aware 
of-a need for connection, for love, for meaning,127 
The problem is this line is especially hard to draw. Lawyers are 
bound to become attached to clients out of a sense of shared 
client-Malcolm found the lawyer-client relationship here to be "as chaste and formal and 
distanced, as abstinent, as such a relationship can be "-on the other hand, they were 
certainly not "just another lawyer and client." Id. at 27-28. 
125. This phenomenon is not unique to lawyers and clients. See MALCOLM, supra note 
114, at 28 Uournalist/author discussing her own relationship with the subjects about whom 
she writes). As Malcolm acknowledges, 
I have felt and succumbed to the pull of another's simple human need for 
diversion (as the subject has felt and succumbed to the pull of mine) and allowed 
myself to stray from the straight and narrow of the work at hand. I have flirted 
and horsed around with subjects. I have enjoyed myself with them as they have 
enjoyed themselves with me. 
Id. On the other hand, Malcolm's relationship with McGough could not have been less 
enjoyable: 
I don't know if I've ever had a more irritating subject. I know I have never 
before behaved so badly to a subject. I have never before interrupted, lost 
patience with, spoken so unpleasantly to a subject as I have to Sheila-to my 
shame and vexation afterward. I have never before dreaded calling a subject on 
the telephone as I have dreaded calling Sheila. To my simplest question she 
would give an answer of such relentless length and tediousness and 
uncomprehending irrelevance that I could almost have wept with impatience. I 
took notes of these phone calls, and among them I have found little cries of 
despair. One of them was: "Help, help! I'm trapped talking to Sheila. She won't 
stop. Save me." 
Id. Malcolm compensated for her constant irritation with McGough by taking "the 
journalist-subject relationship ... to a kind of absurdist level of professionalism and 
impersonality." Id. 
126. See Ogletree, supra note 100, at 1272. 
Id. 
My relationship with my clients approximated a true friendship. I did for my 
clients all that I would do for a friend. I took phone calls at all hours, helped 
clients find jobs, and even interceded in domestic conflicts. I attended my clients' 
weddings and their funerals .... Because I viewed my clients as friends, I did not 
merely feel justified in doing all I could do for them; I felt a strong desire to do 
so. 
127. See generally Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional Interference in 
the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL. L. REV. 259, 270-74 (1999) (discussing 
countertransference in the lawyer-client relationship). 
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humanity/28 and because the lawyer-client relationship is a 
relationship after al1. 129 Attachment is not a bad thing.130 The best 
defenders are often the most attached, the most connected to 
clients.131 From the outside, it may seem obvious where natural and 
appropriate attachment ends and boundary violations begin. From the 
inside, it is not always so easy.132 
I take a pragmatic approach to professional boundaries. I may 
feel a lot for some clients-I may want to move mountains on their 
behalf, and weep when I cannot do it-but I will not do anything to 
jeopardize my ability to practice law.133 I may offer a prisoner a piece 
of gum or candy in clear violation of prison rules, but I will not help 
him escape.134 I may arouse a prosecutor's or judge's ire because of 
128. See Babcock, supra note 51, at 187 (noting that "we all share a common humanity 
with the accused"). 
129. See Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of Care as an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 OEO. L.J. 
2665, 2686 (1993) ("Lawyers and clients are thrown together by the client need that 
generates the relationship. From this more or less intimate encounter can come strong 
feelings, particularly from the client for his lawyer, on whom the client may be dependent 
for emotional sustenance and legal ti;d .... "). The lawyer can have strong feelings for the 
client too. See Silver, supra note 127, at 261 ("The lawyer's devotion to the client's needs is 
not reciprocated by the c1ient."). 
130. See generally Smith, Defending the Innocent, supra note 44 (discussing her 
representation of a client she has known since law school who has now spent more than 
twenty-five years in prison for a crime she did not commit). 
131. See, e.g., Halloran, supra note 109, at 96 ("I've known some [defenders] to drive 
150 miles in a snowstorm after dark to the maximum security prison to visit a lifer who's 
lonely and unloved .... They'll sacrifice home, income ... to save a guilty person from the 
death penalty."). 
132. On the other hand, sometimes the line is clear. See TIM WINTON, DIRT MUSIC 87 
(First Scribner ed. 2001). 
I never heard you play, she says, still toweling off from the shower. People say 
you were good. The three of you. 
Fox slides the omelette onto her plate and proceeds to wash the few dishes on 
the sink. 
Don't keep shrugging like that, she says. It's infuriating. 
I didn't notice, he says. 
You rolled down the shutters, Lu. 
Sorry, he says unapologetic. 
I've crossed the line, then? 
Fox catches himself smiling, thinks: Lady, you're all over the place, you've never 
seen a boundary in your life. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
133. See Abbe Smith, The Difference in Criminal Defense and the Difference It Makes, 
11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'y 83, 90 (2002) ("My approach to the phrase 'within the bounds 
of law' is primarily pragmatic. I would not want to engage in conduct that would jeopardize 
my ability to practice law and serve clients .... Though mindful of the bounds of law, I ... 
will test and challenge it. ") (internal citations omitted). 
134. See Post, supra note 17, at B6 (Stewart agreeing that there are lines she would not 
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impassioned advocacyJ35-even going so far as to risk being cited for 
contempe36-but I won't risk my law license. Although I embrace a 
theory of lawyers' ethics that has generated some controversy,I37 I am 
scrupulous in my application of that theory.l38 In other words, I do 
what I can to be beyond reproach. l39 
This approach may not seem terribly principled. It may appear to 
be more about self-interest than client interest or the interests of the 
legal profession. If all I am saying is don't get caught-or at least if you 
are caught make sure it is not a career-ending sort of offense-then 
Stewart's conduct was perfectly acceptable when it occurred during 
the Clinton administration. Hers was a mistake in timing (and the 
outcome of the closest presidential election ever), not ethics. 140 It is 
worth noting that, as of this writing, to my knowledge, Stewart has not 
been cited by the New York bar for any disciplinary violations. 
Instead, she has been charged under federal criminal law as essentially 
acting as her client's accomplice. 
The truth is zealous lawyers contemplate getting in a little trouble 
from time to time, though they do not expect to be criminally 
prosecuted. What defender has not on occasion violated a prison rule, 
passed on a communication they probably should not have passed on, 
attempted to soften an otherwise harsh criminal justice system? More 
importantly, what zealous, devoted defender refrains from speaking 
for clients simply because they are told not to?141 
cross, including helping a client escape). 
135. See Babcock, supra note 51, at 179. 
136. See generally Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional 
Limitations on the iudicial Contempt Power, Part One: The Conflict Between Advocacy and 
Contempt, 65 WASH. L. REV. 477 (1990) (proposing that being an appropriate advocate for 
your client may require you to impede the traditional search for truth, and this should be 
accepted by courts). 
137. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 47, at vii. 
138. Monroe Freedman is equally scrupulous. However, this did not prevent him from 
facing disciplinary proceedings because of his controversial views on client perjury. See 
Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The 
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1469 (1966). For Freedman's discussion 
of the efforts of former Chief Justice William Burger to discipline him for his views in this 
article, see MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 74-75 (1990). 
139. See Lynda Richardson, Marijuana Should Be Legal, She Says. Pass It On, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at B2 (Ruth Liebesman, executive director of the New York City 
chapter of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), 
noting, "I have to have credibility as a criminal defense lawyer. I have to be above 
reproach."). 
140. Zias Shams Chowdhury, A Rancorous Election: Healing the Wounds, THE 
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I find it hard to believe that Stewart acted as she did to promote 
or carry out terrorism in the name of the suffering people of Egypt. 
Prior to agreeing to represent the sheik-about which Stewart initially 
had misgivingsl42-there is no indication that Stewart knew anything 
about, much less passionately believed in the sheik's cause. There is 
no indication she had especially strong views about politics in the 
Middle East. 143 The fact that Stewart has represented various 
American dissidents, or used a "political defense" in the Larry Davis 
trial,l44 is a far cry from the allegation that she is in cahoots with her 
Islamic fundamentalist client to advance a violent crusade. 
If Stewart-after weighing the risks of her conduct and deciding 
it was worth it in this particular context-simply misjudged the 
government's reaction, there is an explanation for this that may be 
"political" without involving any intent to "provide material 
assistance to a terrorist organization.,,145 Stewart's client was 
incarcerated under the harshest of circumstances-he was basically 
being held incommunicado-and Stewart no doubt felt this was both 
unjust and cruel. l46 The only thing that mattered to the sheik was his 
voice. And yet it was unlikely at best that petitioning the court to 
change the conditions of his confinement would be productive. This 
coupled with the belief that the sheik had been wrongly convictedl47 
may have made Stewart want to stretch the bounds of advocacy on 
her client's behalf.148 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It may be that I am more forgiving than most when it comes to 
lawyers who overstep the bounds of zeal. But, there is a serious 
political problem when the government goes after defense lawyers. 
Because there is a chilling effect on the entire bar, the government 
had better have an incontrovertible, ironclad case when it prosecutes 
you, whether you're accused of terrorism or shoplifting."). 
142. See Gopnik, supra note 11, at 28 
143. See id. 
144. See Levitt & Henican, supra note 15, at 4. Stewart essentially put the police on 
trial in the Davis case. See id. 
145. 18 U.S.c. § 2339A (2000). 
146. See Post, supra note 17 ("I mean there are lines I would not cross for a client's 
best interests ... but we are talking about America, and in America we're supposed to 
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148. See Post, supra note 17 ("[My 1 indictment ... criminalizes what any good lawyer 
would do." (quoting Stewart». 
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lawyers. This is especially so when the government prosecutes lawyers 
who represent unpopular clients. 
In addition, just as I think it is better to be overzealous than 
underzealous,149 I think it is better to be "overdevoted" than the 
alternative. Too many lawyers do not care enough-they lack even 
the most basic respect for clients-resulting in dreadful 
representation.150 This is a serious problem in some indigent criminal 
defense settings.151 On the other hand, sometimes defenders simply 
lack the resources-or the control over caseload-to demonstrate the 
devotion they feel. I52 
Lynne Stewart will soon have her day in court. Perhaps her case 
will be over by the time this article goes to print. Although Stewart's 
case is a cautionary tale for lawyers-especially lawyers representing 
alleged terrorists in these troubled times-no matter the outcome, it 
will not finally resolve the difficult question of the bounds of advocacy 
in criminal defense. 
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